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Over the past two decades, the product Marmite has gained something of a 
celebrity status. Its springboard to prominence has been its use as a metaphor as 
something you either love or hate, an instrument for discerning differences in taste. 
On this foundation, as with other celebrity products, it has been used to endorse 
any number of spin-off products, with the British presumably particularly 
susceptible to cheesy Marmite sprouts.  
There is something of the Marmite about Thomas Piketty and his work. He has shot 
to celebrity status with the publication of Capital in the Twentieth Century in 2014, a 
bestseller from a dry, French, academic economist. Neoliberals will hate him for his 
unsavoury main message, and progressives tend to love him as he points to the 
growing inequality of wealth during the neoliberal period, and he proposes wealth 
taxes and global cooperation to address it. But there is a bit more than yeast and 
salt to the Piketty phenomenon. Indeed, it is more akin to a whole Department Store 
of Marmite-like products, especially in light of his latest book, Capital and Ideology, 
another doorstopper at over 1000 pages. Indeed, if even more so than Marmite with 
its heavy dose of unhealthy salt but healthy dose of vitamin B, unpicking the 
ingredients that make for Piketty reveal an irreducible mix of things to love and to 
hate according to your intellectual and political tastes. 
Let us take a tour of the Department Store, starting in the bargain basement, 
dedicated to method and theory. Piketty’s inevitably disputed, but undisputedly 
positive, contribution has been in (the complex and demanding) measuring of 
wealth inequality across time and place in a voluminous research programme with 
collaborators over many years. This has allowed him to observe how broadly 
inequality increased prior to the twentieth century, declined from the First World 
War to the stagflation of the 1970s, only to return with a vengeance since then. His 
goal is both to explain corresponding historical trajectories and to offer remedies for 
the future. In doing so, he offers a number of methodological starting points. 
First, Piketty both believes in grounding analysis in empirical realities (love it) and 
recognises that the facts do not speak for themselves and are insufficient in and of 
themselves in the absence of reflection (ditto). In this, he explicitly takes mainstream 
economics as a critical point of departure, in light of its abstract, deductive, 
mathematical modelling (for which he purportedly has little time but no one gets 
anywhere as a mainstream economist without – at least in capacity and practice – 
having played that game ), and for which (empirical/statistical) evidence merely 
serves as means of external reference point for (almost inevitably positive) 
validation. This is, of course, appropriately devastating for the dismal science but, 
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from the perspective of other social sciences and of those dedicated to the study of 
methodology itself, the book has very little to offer. This is especially important 
given that the book under review deals in major categories of the social sciences 
such as ideology, the global, the state, national (and other identities), class, race, 
caste, gender and ethnicity. These are rarely critically examined and clarified as 
methodologically and theoretically informed variables. They are more or less taken 
for granted (with “capital” itself the leading example) unlike the empirics dedicated 
to them.  
A notable exception is his taking time off to dismiss populism as a conceptual 
category, pp. 962-65. The reason for doing so is the legitimate observation that, in 
the round, it involves what are often mutually inconsistent elements across its 
application and content – the most obvious example is that of populism’s tendency 
to support individual freedoms (for some but not others) coupled with state 
authoritarianism. But surely the inconsistencies that are characteristic of populism 
conceptually and in practice are part and parcel of what it is. Populism needs to be 
critically deconstructed and contested, not necessarily dismissed. The failure to 
recognise this suggests that Piketty may have a very simple notion of ideology, one 
in which it is subject to consistency and even scholarly standards over which there 
may be disagreements and right or wrong, rather than its being the contradictory 
(and hence inconsistent, incoherent even) reflections of material realities, practices 
and interests. This may also underpin his posture that ideology is both determining 
and autonomous (on which see below). 
More generally, it is unclear methodologically what is the driving unit of analysis – is 
it the individual, the nation or the global – methodological individualism, 
methodological nationalism or methodological holism, quite apart from the mix of 
socio-economic and socio-cultural categories given the importance that he assigns 
to the formation and influence of (primarily intra-national) identities. Piketty moves 
seamlessly between these categories as, at least in part, his underlying 
methodology lies elsewhere specifying in his own way what would from a Marxist 
perspective be a way of defining distinctions between modes of production. In 
place of relations of production, we have broadly-conceived property relations. 
Their role in history, if implicitly and possibly unconsciously, is projected back from 
what is taken to be contemporary “hypercapitalism” in which the “borders” of 
ownership society (who belongs and is allowed to own what and how) have been 
extensively stretched. Both in the past and in the twentieth century, corresponding 
borders were constrained by the overlap of politics and ownership since, in 
premodern societies, political and property regimes are deemed to coincide, 
variously making up slave, colonial and ternary formations (the latter negotiating 
relations between the clerical/religious, the noble/warrior, and the 
labourer/commoner). In the twentieth century, the drive towards hypercapitalism, 
evident in the nineteenth century, has been thwarted by social democracy and 
communism, and their reactions against the inequality that derives from ownership. 
 
 
But what drives such grand historical change, the counterpart to the forces of 
production within schematic Marxism. At times explicitly, Piketty brandishes a two-
sided banner on a march against inequality which is itself seen as decisive in 
defining and driving the passage from one period of history to another. One side of 
the banner privileges the role of ideology and politics - “Inequality is neither 
economic nor technological; it is ideological and political”, p. 7. As a result, Piketty’s 
history is one in which glaring inequalities and the like are subject to the dynamic 
tensions of self-justification of the indefensible inegalitarian. He perceives each 
society as developing its own sense of (contested) social justice in ways that do not 
necessarily reflect other social (or economic) determinants. Indeed, “In contrast [to 
Marxism], I insist that the realm of ideas, the political-ideological sphere, is truly 
autonomous”, p. 7. In this way, history becomes a contest of reconciling growing 
ownership society with the ideology and politics attached to the aversion to 
inequality. 
Such grand postures, lacking precision in meaning let alone veracity even by casual 
knowledge, are both scattered across his book and contradicted within it by his 
own detailed analyses – through which ideology and politics are shown not to be 
autonomous and the economic and technological vital in influencing inequality. And, 
at the end of the day, and certainly in human history, is it not the commonest 
response to (growing) inequality to seek to ignore it altogether rather than to 
highlight and justify it? Or simply to rely upon the maxim that might is right and 
social justice can go to hell as the luxury of the moral philosopher? Inequality, as 
Piketty only knows too well, has to be put on the agenda; it is not there as a matter 
of course. Indeed, it is the most unequal societies through history that are most 
likely not to rationalise, but brutally impose inequality without justifying it unless 
forced to do so. 
On the other side of Piketty’s banner is the rejection of determinism, reductionism 
or whatever. This has two closely-related aspects. On the one hand, history is 
deemed to matter in terms of the ideologies and politics handed down from 
previous property relations and their accompaniments; on the other hand, whatever 
the situation, things could develop differently. Thus, in the context of the rise of 
Reaganism and Thatcherism, “As usual, however, it would be a mistake to interpret 
these trajectories in a deterministic fashion. These long-term intellectual and 
ideological shifts were important, but there were also many switch points where 
things might have taken a different course.”, p. 836. 
But if history and context matter – and who could disagree – this raises the more 
precise issues of how much and in what ways. In this respect, it is time to shift from 
the basement of our Marmite store, to the mezzanine of interdisciplinarity, and the 
ground floor of the social sciences. On interdisicplinarity, Piketty departs from 
mainstream economics, or apparently so, not only by his aversion to mathematical 
modelling but by his readiness to include other forms of discourse (organised 
around the evidence) and non-economic factors alongside and even privileging 
insights from other social sciences. Many love this but is he pushing against an 
 
 
open door with his taste for being more rounded? Indeed, does he go far enough in 
his openness and how much of a break is it from mainstream economics?  
For mainstream economics has long had varieties of relations with other social 
sciences, that I have dubbed economics imperialism. Initially, it sought to treat the 
non-economic as if it were economic – everything is as if a perfectly working market 
if we would but acknowledge it. Subsequently, economics understood the non-
economic as if it were a response to imperfectly working markets (institutions, 
including the state, exist to put the market right whether they do a good or bad job). 
Currently, economics imperialism is characterised by taking its own theories based 
on more or less perfectly working markets and supplementing them, however 
consistently and coherently, with whatever factors it cares to purloin from the other 
social sciences – with behavioural factors to the fore, most notably in the 
psychology of herding in financial markets or “nudging” as a policy tool for 
correcting the supposedly individually irrational or socially irresponsible.  
This latest phase of economics imperialism is itself often welcomed as a form of 
progress but it is more appropriately seen as a telling indictment of mainstream 
economics – not for its previous interdisciplinary insularity  as such but for its 
inability to address economic realities on its own terms whilst refusing to be more 
open to other economic approaches. As it were, the Global Financial Crisis has left 
us floundering, so let’s supplement, not question, our pre-existing theories by 
piecemeal plunder of the other social sciences and otherwise leave our economics 
unquestioned. 
In his own idiosyncratic way, this is a view that can be taken of Piketty. First, in 
terms of his own economic theory, as was observed by many critics of his earlier 
volume, it does not break with, and even employs, orthodoxy. In particular, he drew 
upon the (in)famous formula r>g (rate of return on capital is greater than the rate of 
growth) to explain why inequality of wealth should grow (especially for those who 
inherit). This does not appear in his second volume but nor is there any economic 
theory to substitute for it – and certainly no theory of “capital” despite its titular 
presence across both books. Rather, he offers more of a focus upon how the non-
economic redistributes from whatever unexplained distribution is determined by 
economic (or other) factors in the first place. This is clearly unsatisfactory as a 
theory of distribution or, indeed, of redistribution since without the former we remain 
uncertain how it influences the scope for, and outcomes from, the latter. It is all very 
well expecting a more progressive ideology and/or politics to redistribute but from 
what base and, again as Piketty is only too well aware, the more the wealth the 
more the (negative) political and ideological influence over its redistribution. In short 
and ironically, on the mezzanine, interdisciplinarity offers limited scope for 
economics (or political economy) as such and tends to embrace other social 
sciences in ways that are inevitably selective if not arbitrary. 
In particular, moving to the ground floor, and its sectional organisation into 
disciplines, history by far takes the most space, more than all other disciplines put 
together (with more for literature, say, than geography other than as the places 
 
 
where history takes place rather than urbanisation or land other than as an asset 
contributing to wealth). We are offered select histories from around the world, good, 
bad or indifferent, and more or less detailed, organised around various countries 
and regions, drawing upon the property ownership methodology previously 
outlined. As a result, what emerges is a very deterministic approach, Piketty’s 
claims to the contrary, based upon imperatives that conflict with one another. One 
is, as mentioned, the increasing reach and concentration of property. But this can 
be counterbalanced through social democratic reactions especially emanating from 
the class of labour. But as property ownership becomes increasingly global so each 
nation competes with others to retain capital within its borders, thereby 
undermining the capacity for social democratic policies based on redistribution 
through taxation. This, in turn, has two effects – one is to weaken and undermine 
social democracy and the other is to substitute the politics of identity for those of 
class. This has all played into the hands of hypercapitalism, or (globalised) 
neoliberalism as it is more commonly termed by most of us today. 
Thus, first, historically, we witness the triumph of ownership of capital until around 
the beginnings of the first world war, after which there is a watershed in which 
social democracy begins to take over, reducing inequality until the second 
watershed arising out of the collapse of the post-war boom and the emergence of 
neoliberalism. Second, inevitably, this simple scheme cannot fit the historical 
record, so history matters more to allow variation in the timing and substance of 
outcomes – although, insofar as we can quantify these things, it would be hard in 
general to argue that the interlude of the more social democratic period of 
dispositions was more favourable to the politics of identity than currently (especially 
around racism and sexism, although these have their hotspots of resurgence across 
the globe in the neoliberal period). Third, then, this means that the long historical 
narratives in which Piketty engages are, to a large extent, superfluous. All that 
matters is the contemporary configuration of classes and identities, and their 
corresponding cultures and politics. Otherwise, how they got to be the way they are 
is of limited significance. Fourth, admittedly and on the other hand, history serves a 
different purpose and imperative for Piketty, as already mentioned, that it 
demonstrates that things could be and have been different since his histories are 
designed to reveal diversities of outcomes. Yet, those diversities seem to be very 
limited around the core dynamics.  
These core arguments, and the rationale for the expressed reservations over them, 
are neatly summarised as follows, adding that the wealth (class) side of things wins 
only if the “identitarian cleavages” can be overcome, emphasis added:  
We find the same pattern in virtually every region of the world: the 
identity cleavage deepened … while the wealth cleavage 
weakened and criticism of wealth became muted. Yet … the 
variations from society to society remain significant. No deterministic 
explanation can account for such diversity: what matters are social 
 
 
and political mobilization strategies. Here, the long-term comparative 
perspective is essential”, p. 959. 
As mentioned, it seems as if the shifting relative strengths of the cleavages are 
deterministic of the ideological postures on, and hence actual loss, of wealth 
redistribution under hypercapitalism but, at most, there is variation around, and not 
of, this shift away from redistribution in light of history for which a long-term 
perspective seems far from mandatory. Indeed, we are also informed that “historical 
change stems from the interaction between … the short-term logic of political 
events and … the long-term logic of political ideologies”, p. 113. This is indicative of 
a very loose notion of history as the long term (a way in which economists actually 
dispense with the need to take history into account at all) which is as long and short 
as you like ( a week in politics …). As it is also suggested that the variation in case 
of India and Brazil is represented in the political realm by the (exceptional) 
persistence of class over identity, one wonders how well the historical and 
contemporary signs of class, religion, race and ethnicity have been read. 
This is already to have moved from the history to the politics section. Here 
reference in the long quote previously to the importance of “social and political 
mobilization strategies” is entirely misleading. It is one of very few references to 
political and social organisations and conflicts other than in the electoral domain. 
Indeed, a major part of the discussion of the stage prior to that of hypercapitalism, 
and to neoliberalism itself, is taken up by the reduction of politics to psephology 
and, in particular, how working class votes have been won to and then lost in the 
battle for redistribution by being captured by the appeal of identarianism whether by 
virtue of nationalism, racism or along ethnic or religious lines. 
This is, then, across our watersheds, an account of the rise and fall of social 
democratic parties especially as Piketty views these, and the societies they bring 
about, as being not only socialist to some degree but also other than capitalism. 
Thus, between 1914 and 1945, “The collapse [of ownership societies] was so 
complete the nominally capitalist countries actually turned into social democracies 
between 1950 and 1980 through a mixture of policies including nationalizations, 
public education, health and pension reforms, and progressive taxation of the 
highest incomes and largest fortunes”, p. 486. The determining factor in “the 
disappearance of European ownership societies”, p. 429, was reaction against the 
challenge of socialism/communism; the twilight of colonialism, and the exacerbation 
of nationalism and racism. Even so, again and again, we are told that the failure of 
communism was itself a major factor in the ideological renewal of ownership society 
(although there might be thought to be a problem with timing as neoliberal 
hegemony predates the collapse, and most severe discrediting of the Soviet bloc, 
and do we really believe the Cold War would not have happened irrespective of the 
virtues of actually existing socialism?). And social democracy itself is also blamed 
for being too faint-hearted, Blair as exemplar, for failing to address redistribution of 
wealth and greater social participation in ownership and control. For “social 
democracy, for all its successes, has suffered from a number of intellectual and 
 
 
institutional shortcomings, especially with respect to social ownership, equal access 
to education, transcendence of the nation-state, and progressive taxation of 
wealth”, p. 576. A major reason for this is seen as unequal access to higher 
education, both reinforcing wealth inequalities and gentrifying the leadership of 
social democratic parties. And, to some extent, the failure to develop co-
management at places of work is seen as the result of pursuing what was perceived 
to be the supposedly more radical goal of public ownership without attention to co-
management.   
This does, however, seem to justify to Piketty without further discussion a limited 
role for public ownership as opposed to wealth redistribution with co-management 
– the pursuit of a more egalitarian capitalism. But why can public ownership and co-
management not be pursued in tandem? Indeed, politically and strategically, they 
might be seen as potentially reinforcing one another and only liable to be sustained 
in practice by co-existing with one another. 
In the sorts of propositions put forward by Piketty, there is much to engage both 
sociologists (around stratification, mobility, and their implications) and anthropology 
and cultural studies for their takes on identities. Yet, the selection of Marmites on 
offer in these respects are extremely limited with more or less casual observation 
around how various (political, ideological, educational, identarian and inequality) 
regimes mutually condition one another, and voting patterns in particular. The 
remorseless, if apparently resistible, drive towards hypercapitalism is a 
consequence of the global reach of property ownership and the intranational 
fragmentation of social democratic resistance by virtue of the politics of identity 
rather than class (of the dispossessed).  
This is to move to the top floor of policy alternatives (but see above on why public 
ownership does not occupy a prominent place). Piketty’s posture is relatively simple 
– given his disappointment with social reformism as yet, and his dismissal of 
communism, with the following representing his mildest presentation, “The Soviet 
failure is also one of the main political-ideological factors responsible for the global 
rise of inequality in the 1980s”, p. 579. Instead, he is a proponent of the golden age 
of Scandinavian social democracy plus. What he wants is to add a wealth tax, 
higher education for all, and social ownership, in part at the workplace and in part 
through redistribution on a continual basis – although, unnoticed, this is 
disadvantageous to those in employment (or not at all) where ownership is not 
involved, as with state and subcontracted and casualised jobs, thereby liable to 
worsen inequalities. How this is to be achieved is primarily derived from the twin 
propositions of the determining role of ideology and that history and variation shows 
alternatives are possible. Unity by class (the dispossessed) must win against 
identitarianism. Further, analytically and strategically, he is mindful that his goals 
cannot be achieved in the absence of global cooperation and administration, and 
much energy is spent in highlighting the inadequacies of both the powers and the 
democracy attached to the EU – he seeks social federalism on a global scale.  
 
 
Throughout the book, though, there is a blinkered vision of contemporary realities in 
part due to the abiding focus on inequality as the prism through which all else is 
reflected, if not refracted, and in part due to the idiosyncratic selection for inclusion 
of some factors to the exclusion of others. As already remarked, the role of social 
movements, rather than, or even through, electoral politics, as the harbinger of 
change is more or less absent even though neoliberalism has witnessed the 
swingeing decline of the strength, organisation and influence of the trade union 
movement. Similarly, beyond higher education, the role of social provisioning – in 
housing, health, transport, energy, pensions and so on – is equally notably 
neglected not only as a source of inequalities in and of themselves and in wealth as 
a consequence, but also as strategic levers for organising for alternatives alongside 
wages and working conditions. Equally, the role of financialisation is mentioned in 
limited fashion and only in passing even though this has played the major role in 
underpinning what he terms as a “Hyper-financialized world” p. 644, without further 
analysis. Yet financialisation has been key in appropriating an increasing scope and 
degree of influence over economic and social reproduction, from the global to 
everyday life, from the economy through the media to the revolving doors of 
ownership, consultancy, advisor, and politician. The decline of progressive social 
movements alongside their marginalisation in participating in decision-making has 
followed from the increasing authoritarian centralisation of decision-making under 
neoliberalism, alongside a faux decentralisation of responsibility without resources. 
In these respects, the EU is the rule not the exception, and even its detailed doing 
over of individual countries, with Greece to the fore, is notable for the failure of 
solidarity protests from other self-sidelining national governments and movements. 
There is much more and much more important to all of this than identity politics 
ruling over class politics in elections. 
But, despite intentions to the contrary, I have wondered away from dealing with 
Piketty as Marmites as such to Piketty as not some other relish, whether 
gentleman’s, peanut butter, marmalade, jam or even confiture. We do get some 
understanding of what Piketty is by highlighting what he is not. And, in response to 
his earlier book, a whole industry of mini- and street markets gathered around the 
department store to peddle their own versions of what he did or did not have to say, 
what was right and wrong about it, and offering their own alternatives. Such is the 
price to be paid for being a celebrity – although detractors, and even supporters, 
love to point out that Kindle readers have rarely gone beyond twenty or more pages 
of his earlier 700-page text (itself cut by 200 pages for the translation), a coffee 
table download for the dilettantes. Across all the social sciences, Piketty has offered 
extensive scope for agreement or disagreement, and gratitude for bringing 
inequality to a discipline’s attention with regret for past neglect. 
Yet, it still remains a mystery why Piketty should have shot to such prominence, 
with interest spreading globally from origins within the United States once hitting 
the New York Times bestseller list, even outdoing fiction. Reasons include: timing, 
with his book coming in the wake of the global financial crisis and exposure of, and 
intellectual antipathy to, the undeserving wealthy; the sharp challenge to dominant 
 
 
self-serving elite ideologies around the efficacy and justice of market rewards (even 
where inheritance and privilege are shown to be key); the trigger point of inequality 
itself; the appeal to middle class sensibilities in blaming those above them in the 
wealth and income hierarchy and sympathising with those below; Piketty’s well-
deserved and enviable status as a mainstream economist dedicated to uncovering 
empirical realities and drawing out their implications; and so a secure presence 
within mainstream thinking and scholarship even if drawing unfashionable 
conclusions around wealth taxes. None of this seems to suffice to explain the 
Piketty phenomenon – why inequality, why him, and why so strong. Perhaps in a 
world of celebrities and K-pop, it had to be something, and this predominates over 
who or what happens to be the chosen one or thing. 
 
By the same token, celebrities rise and fall, and the chances are that this volume is 
a doorstep too far, and too close in thrust and, to some degree, substance to the 
earlier hit to sustain popular appeal. But what will be the longer-term consequences 
of the Piketty phenomenon? As many have commented, the main short-term effect 
has been to put inequality on the agenda as well as correspondingly progressive 
policies. Sorry to say that, despite Piketty’s own posture that ideology (and 
scholarship) is a, if not the, determining factor, within his own domain of progressive 
economists (with one foot in the mainstream) the evidence is to the contrary. Whilst 
the likes of Stiglitz and Krugman, Nobel Prizewinners and longstanding, energetic 
and popular pundits have been highly influential intellectuals in the domain of seeing 
the world as one of imperfectly working markets, their influence on policy has been 
negligible if not non-existent.  
 
But what of the more limited scope for shifting the world of scholarship and 
ideology itself as a knock-on effect, with the extent to which it is taken up in policy 
(and broader social transformation) contingent upon the organisation and strength 
of labour and social movements for alternatives (something that goes beyond and 
differs in many respects from Piketty’s plea for the subordination of identarian to 
class politics). This will depend primarily upon developments within one discipline 
as opposed to another despite Piketty’s own commendable commitment to 
interdisciplinarity. 
 
Here, the evidence from economics itself is instructive. Paradoxically, interest in 
inequality was considerable just before the rise of the neoliberal period, a gift from 
the social reformism of the post-war boom, and just as inequality had enjoyed its 
long period of decline. A pioneer in the field was Amartya Sen, in part awarded a 
Nobel Prize for his related work in social choice theory which has strong affinities 
with measuring inequality. A major element for mainstream economists in the 
appeal of studying inequality, and highly characteristic of early work, was not only 
attention to the empirical details of what to measure and how, with what results, but 
also the technical details of measurement. This is in part an exercise in statistical 
theory but substantively it involves making interpersonal and intra-personal 
comparisons. How much is more income to be evaluated to be worth to any 
particular individual and how much is it worth relative to richer and poorer 
individuals (with an aversion to inequality suggesting more income to the poor is 
 
 
worth more to them the poorer they are themselves and the poorer they are relative 
to the rich).  
 
Such concerns, in a social reformist environment, briefly allowed for a bright light to 
shine on inequality studies, not least promoting Sen to prominence as an 
economist. As Sen himself embarked upon an intellectual trajectory that took him 
through entitlements, capabilities, and freedom, his more rounded approach 
(engaging moral philosophy in particular) left him high and dry as far as mainstream 
economists are concerned. At most, inequality within mainstream economics 
continued to tread the same concerns from which Sen had moved on, marginalising 
itself within the discipline and from interdisciplinarity. Accordingly, the most likely 
response to Piketty within mainstream economics is liable to be the formal 
modelling and estimation of his supposedly non-deterministic propositions outline 
above, the form taken by economics imperialism in the contemporary period as 
previously suggested – even if this would not be to Piketty’s own taste. Indeed, 
such modelling is already up and running prior to and without the need for prompt 
from Piketty – let us not forget the freakonomics phenomenon that has inspired a 
shopping mall of department stores, or the economics of everything for sale. 
 
In this light, Piketty represents a major breath of fresh air for his commitment not 
only to a more radical social reformism, but also to interdisciplinarity and the 
rejection of the methods and substance of mainstream economics, no matter how 
far and in what directions he himself goes with these. That he does so at all, and is 
celebrated, is significant. Inequality may have been the banner on which these 
scripts have been written and taken up but they are of much broader relevance, not 
least for issues that Piketty has barely touched upon or overlooked altogether. 
Further, France itself has a long tradition of radical political economy, 
interdisciplinarity and public and progressive intellectuals. But these, especially 
political economy, have been heavily and acceleratingly eroded over the past two 
decades thanks to the unremitting control and hostility of a now dominant French 
establishment of US-trained mainstream economics within the country’s 
universities, with central control over leading professorial appointments. By 
remaining aloof from the well-organised struggle to bring formal recognition within 
the French higher education system to retain and strengthen the continuing 
traditions of political economy, Piketty has failed to put into practice the targeting of 
the ideological that he sees as the key to progressive change, not putting his new-
found prominence to work within economics upon his home turf. Yet, he also 
confesses to have become more radical over time – “I was initially more liberal and 
less socialist than I am now”, p. 1039, and his new book displays implicitly a ready 
willingness to come to terms with criticism. So hope springs eternal that he will 
throw his weight behind those who might follow the path taken by his own tentative 
footsteps as well as establishing broader and sounder foundations, beyond 
considerations of inequality and its interdisciplinary and historical correlates alone. 
 
Ben Fine 
